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1.  The Impact of Merger Decisions 
Competition is a self-organized, decentralized coordination process. It coordi-
nates suppliers and customers on markets through price signals reflecting 
changing scarcities. Without requiring individual knowledge on overall alloca-
tion issues and without requiring the individual goal to balance supply and de-
mand, competition sets incentives for both market sides to adjust the individual 
supply and demand plans according to the scarcity relations just by acting self-
interested (profit and utility maximization). Consequently, allocative efficiency 
is achieved through individual interaction in competition and without interven-
tion or ex ante planning by any centralized authority (government, economic 
planning commission, etc.). Furthermore, competition provides incentives for 
producers and other suppliers to innovate. Only in competitive marketplaces, 
firms can benefit from being innovative by dragging customers away from 
competing firms and increasing their own market shares. At the same time, non-
innovative firms must fear that more innovative competitors drag their custom-
ers away by providing innovative products or services better suiting the prefer-
ences of customers. This ‘double incentive’ adds on the intrinsic motivation to 
innovate because of engineering curiosity and, thus, considerably increases the 
incentives to innovate compared to non-competitive ‘market’places. Further on, 
this innovation effect of competition is turned into a permanent incentive by the 
incentive to imitate innovators. This entails the procompetitive effect of allow-
ing only temporary competitive advantages through innovation, maintaining the 
incentive to further innovate for hitherto successful innovators. Next to the allo-
cation effect (stationary efficiency) and the innovation effect (dynamic efficien-
cy), competition keeps markets flexible and creates and maintains a high ability 
of markets to adapt to changing market environments. Firms (and customers) in 
competitive markets are trained to adjust their business behavior creatively and 
adaptively to each other (strategic interdependency) and, thus, are better capa-
ble of coping with external shocks (changing market environment) than firms in 
non-competitive settings (evolutionary efficiency). Through all three avenues, 
competition serves the normative goal of increasing economic welfare.  
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In addition to these economic welfare-related competition effects, there is one 
more effect relating to societal goals. Competition is inevitably intertwined with 
economic freedom. Having competition among suppliers requires the freedom 
of choice on the side of the customers as well as the freedom to choose strate-
gies (pricing, innovation, product design, service, industry, etc.) on the side of 
the enterprises. And, the other way around, economic freedom for enterprises 
and customers automatically and inevitably creates competition. 
 
All these beneficial effects of competition are achieved in a decentralized and 
self-organized way in the absence of centralized, political planning or organiza-
tion of the economy. However, the notion of free markets unleashing the bene-
ficial forces of competition is also misleading to some extent. Competitive mar-
kets require an institutional framework in order to be sustainable and workable 
and this turns them into a social construction. Among the institutional precondi-
tions for competitive markets are property rights, commercial laws and many 
more. Among the necessary institutions for the sustainable existence and func-
tioning of competitive markets are competition rules. Unfortunately, competi-
tion possesses an inherent tendency towards self-destruction. Instead of aiming 
to be better than its competitors, any enterprise can alternatively attempt to im-
prove its market situation by eroding competition, for instance by colluding 
with its competitors (cartelization), predating and deterring competitors (abuse 
of market power and unfair competition) or by merging with its competitors in-
to one entity (mergers and acquisitions). This incentive to circumvent and erode 
the forces of competition requires competition rules and its enforcement 
through competition policy. Therefore, the ‘impact’ of merger decisions (as part 
of competition policy) should be to protect and maintain competition by pre-
venting the occurrence of anticompetitive mergers. As such, merger decisions 
should exercise a low degree of interventionism into markets by ‘just’ prevent-
ing anticompetitive combinations of enterprise ownership (negative interven- 
7 
tion). In contrast, merger decisions should not attempt to design or mould com-
petitive market structures (positive, creative intervention).
1 
 
Now, in an imperfect world, merger decisions can be mistaken. Although the 
task at hand might look easy at first sight – procompetitive or anticompetitive, 
harm to competition or not – it is made rather complicated by the multidimen-
sional character of competition (allocation, innovation, diversity, etc.). Compe-
tition can be harmed in many ways: price increases and output reduction, slow-
ing down innovation, making markets more sclerotic, etc. From an economic 
theory perspective, it cannot be discriminated between the different dimensions 
of competition regarding their importance for overall welfare. The fact that em-
phasis of analysis and policy is oftentimes more put on prices and quantities (al-
locative efficiency) merely follows practical limitations regarding measurability 
and assessability of the other dimensions. In summary, the question when a 
merger has a negative impact on competition is far away from being trivial! 
 
Consequently, merger decisions can be wrong in two different ways: (i) merger 
decisions may erroneously prohibit procompetitive mergers (type I errors), or 
(ii) merger decisions may erroneously allow anticompetitive mergers (type II 
errors). Both error types change the impact of merger decisions. In case of type 
II errors, the merger decision fails to protect competition on the market in ques-
tion. In case of type I errors, the merger decision represents an unnecessary in-
tervention into competition and efficiency effects of procompetitive mergers 






                                                            
1  Drawing the borderline between these two types of intervention may at times be difficult in practice, 
for instance, when it comes to conditional approvals of mergers.  
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2.  Methods of Ex Post Impact Evaluation 
2.1.  Controlling of Merger Policy 
Merger control decisions are ex ante decisions. They attempt to estimate the ef-
fect that a notified merger will have on the underlying markets if it was cleared 
by the competition authority. If we assume that competition authorities aim to 
make correct merger decisions in the sense of avoiding both type I and type II 
errors, then an ex post evaluation of past merger decisions represents an instru-
ment to improve future decisions by learning from past mistakes.
2 As soon as 
merger effects display sufficient regularities (i.e. mergers do not represent 
unique single events), such a controlling of merger policy possesses the poten-
tial of beneficial improvements of merger decisions and, thus, welfare.
3 
 
However, conducting an ex post impact evaluation of merger decisions is not 
automatically advantageous. A disadvantage occurs if many decisions of a 
competition authority are found to have been erroneous. Firstly, this may dam-
age the reputation of the authority and, thereby, harming the deterrence effect of 
competition rules and policies as well as the acceptance of future merger deci-
sions by the norm addressees. Secondly, the question of damage claims by en-
terprises (type I errors) or by customers and competitors (type II errors) being 
harmed by an erroneous decision must be taken into consideration (depending 
on the jurisdiction in question). Furthermore, it must be considered that the 
evaluation results themselves set incentives for competition authorities regard-
ing the future selection of cases, possibly entailing a selection bias: rational 
                                                            
2  See for an excellent and much more elaborated discussion of the basic fundaments, motivations and 
processes of ex post evaluation of competition authorities (but not so much of the evaluation meth-
ods) Kovacic (2006). 
3  Note that although competition authorities usually follow some type of welfare goal, the specificity of 
the welfare goal can differ, for instance and most famously between a consumer welfare standard and 
a total welfare standard. Also, goals like public interest or freedom of competition at least implicitly 
target a welfare goal, albeit through intermediate goals.  
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agencies experience incentives to go for the easy options, i.e. cases with a high 
probability of receiving enforcement success and positive ex post evaluation 
(Davies & Ormosi 2010: 40). Instead of aiming for the protection of competi-
tion or for improving welfare, competition authorities may for receiving favor-
able evaluation results. As long as ex post evaluation works perfectly, this need 
not be a problem. 
 
Another important disadvantage, however, occurs if agencies rely on unreliable 
evaluation methods, systematically displaying erroneous results regarding the 
accuracy of past merger decisions. Then, the decision quality could actually de-
teriorate as a consequence of learning from to the deficient ex post evaluation. 
In contrast to science, the rule ‘bad or weak information is still better than no 
information’ does not hold here since the ‘bad’ information triggers a behavior-
al response (Neven & Zenger 2008) by the competition authorities. Therefore, 
any ex post impact evaluation must guarantee a sufficient reliability of its re-
sults. In other words, reliability becomes a knock-out criterion for the usability 
of any given evaluation method. Given a sufficient minimum reliability, addi-
tional criteria can be applied to comparatively evaluate the usefulness of ex post 
evaluation methods for competition authorities wanting to engage in systematic 
ex post evaluations of their merger decisions. 
 
Method Evaluation Categories 
 
‐  Reliability of results: competence of the method to identify decision 
errors. This is a prior category (knock-out criterion); any method 
that fails to meet a minimum reliability cannot be recommended. 
‐  Applicability: can the method be applied to all types of cases, all 
types of markets, etc.? 
‐  Agency resource intensity: what are the resource requirements of 
applying the method for the agency (“costs” of applying the meth-
od)?  
10 
‐  Academic mainstream: acceptance of a method within economics 
science (‘mainstream’); for instance, number of (ranked) publica-
tions, etc. 
 
In contrast to other studies, these evaluation categories partly possess a hierar-
chical structure. Buccirossi et al. (2008: 464) argue that ex post evaluation 
“techniques cannot be ranked, as each has its advantages and drawbacks”; “they 
are not mutually exclusive, and it is possible, or even advisable, to use more 
than one simultaneously in order to minimize the probability of errors in the 
evaluation” (465). However, if a technique is not reliable to minimum stand-
ards, it cannot contribute to better evaluation – even within a mix of instru-
ments. Quite in contrast, it actually jeopardizes any beneficial effect of an ex 
post impact evaluation and might even generate harmful effects (increase in 
type I and type II errors). This danger is particularly high if additionally a feasi-
bility bias comes into play. A comparatively unreliable but cheap and easy-to-
do technique is likely to get an inappropriate high weight in practice because of 
economics of administration – it is easily feasible. For these reasons, reliability 
receives the accentuated position of being a knock-out criterion: a failure in re-
liability cannot be compensated by a good performance in the other categories. 
For instance, it does not help that any given method can be easily applied with 
very few resources required if the results are not sufficiently reliable! 
 
The scientific mainstream criterion, on the other hand, resumes a downward po-
sition within the category hierarchy, since the frequency of method appearance 
in the scientific literature, inter alia, follows motivations that need not go along 
with the goals of ex post impact evaluation of merger decisions (e.g. writing 




                                                            
4  Due to space limitations, this criterion is left out in this paper version. It will be included in a forth-
coming, substantially longer version.  
11 
The main methods that are available for conducting ex post impact evaluation 
of merger decisions can be categorized in the following types: 
 
‐  structural models and simulations, 
‐  difference-in-differences (DiD) approaches, 
‐  event studies, and 
‐  surveys. 
 
These methods are analyzed in the following sections according to the evalua-
tion categories developed in this section. 
2.2.  Structural Models and Simulations 
Overviews: Buccirossi et al. (2008: 465-466); Budzinski & Ruhmer (2010: 312-
314); Davies & Ormosi (2010: 12-15). 
 
Applications (examples): Nevo (2000); Pinske & Slade (2004); Peters (2006); 
Weinberg & Hosken (2008). 
 
This method of ex post impact evaluation is based on (i) an explicit formal 
model of the nature of competition in the relevant market(s) of the merger, (ii) 
calibrating this model with real world data, and (iii) an assessment how the ac-
tual equilibrium would change if a counterfactual scenario (e.g. merger vs. no 





                                                            
5  Merger simulations may also be used by the competition authority when deciding upon a merger 
(overview: Budzinski & Ruhmer 2010). These ex ante simulations serve to predict the post-merger 
equilibrium, whereas ex post simulation compares the actual post-merger decision market equilibrium 




The main advantage of this method is its reliance on a sound and up-to-date 
game-theoretical foundation (Buccirossi et al. 2008: 465; Davies & Ormosi 
2010: 14; Budzinski 2011). Furthermore, the accuracy of the underlying model 
can be tested through the calibration with real market data. This is in particular 
true for an ex post analysis. Only a fine-tuned calibration of the estimated mod-
el to the characteristics of the underlying market will reproduce the actual mar-
ket development (Buccirossi et al. 2008: 465). In contrast to ex ante simulation 
where the extrapolation of the pre-merger market model to the – at the time of 
the decision – hypothetical post-merger equilibrium generates several short-
comings regarding the predictive power of simulation models (Budzinski & 
Ruhmer 2010; Budzinski 2011), ex post simulation alleviates many of these lim-
itations. Insofar, criticism that this method requires a large set of assumptions 
whose fit to the actual market is sensitive for the reliability of the results (Buc-
cirossi et al. 2008: 466; Davies & Ormosi 2010: 14) appears to be more fitting 
to ex ante simulations as to ex post simulations. This can actually be controlled 
rather well. Furthermore, the accuracy of the assumptions made at the time of 
the decision/intervention by the competition authority can be evaluated with 
this method (Davies & Ormosi 2010: 14). 
 
However, this is strictly true only for the actual market development. In order to 
assess whether the merger decision has been correct, the actual post-merger de-
velopment must be compared to a counterfactual. It is one of the advantages of 
this method that it allows for simulating alternative scenarios (counterfactuals), 
corresponding to different changes in the underlying market environment (Buc-
cirossi et al. 2008: 465). To some limited extent, the pre-merger market may 
provide guidance for the counterfactuals, however, more accurately, the model 
should be used to simulate alternative post-decision scenarios. These simula-
tions, then, rely on the assumption that the underlying competition model would 
have been the same if the counterfactual scenarios actually happened. While 
this assumption may be true for many cases, it is well possible that a big merger  
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impacts a market to an extent that it changes the fundamental nature of compe-
tition (Budzinski 2011). 
 
In this context, it certainly is a shortcoming of this method that a reliable evalu-
ation requires the underlying market to match one of the popular standard mod-
els of modern oligopoly economics, in particular the game-theoretic homogene-
ous Cournot oligopoly model (quantity competition with rather homogenous 
goods) or the game-theoretic heterogeneous Bertrand oligopoly model (price 
competition with differentiated products). If real-market competition differs 
from these standard models, the reliability of evaluation results suffers. Fur-
thermore and therefore, ex post evaluation of merger decisions through struc-
tural models and simulation focuses on price and quantity effects. It tends to 
neglect other dimensions of competition, like innovation, repositioning, struc-
tural breaks, market entry, etc. (Davies & Ormosi 2010: 14; Budzinski & 
Ruhmer 2010). In particular, the inclusion of several of these dimensions and 
the interaction between the dimensions represent a near-to-impossible task 
(Budzinski 2011). 
 
If done seriously and with a view to the limitations, however, structural models 
and ex post simulation produce reliable results, providing valuable insights in 




The applicability range is firstly limited by the requirement that the relevant 
markets must be sufficiently matched by available structural models. As a re-
sult, the simulation method is skewed towards certain types of markets and suf-
fers from a likely sample selection bias (Davies & Ormosi 2010: 14). Secondly, 
the extensive and ambitious data requirements regarding both quantity and 
quality of the data further narrow down the number of cases where this method 
can be applied for ex post evaluations (Buccirossi et al. 2008: 466; Davies & 
Ormosi 2010: 14). Furthermore, this method is said to be not applicable to cases  
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involving behavioral remedies as a special type of merger clearances under 
conditions or with commitments (Buccirossi et al. 2008: 465-466). In summary, 




Structural modeling and simulation probably represents the most sophisticated 
method to assess competitive impacts. Moreover, the evaluation must be done 
on a case-by-case level. Consequently, it requires extensive agency resources to 
either engage in producing this type of ex post evaluations or commission re-
spective studies. A full-blown ex post merger decision impact analysis involves 
high-end economic expertise, time-intensive data collection and generation as 
well as in most cases comprehensive cooperation from companies within the 
relevant market. While the latter can normally be enforced in the context of a 
merger decision without considerable problems, any cooperation of companies 
regarding ex post analyses is voluntary and may require some compensation.
6 
Notwithstanding, simplified simulation approaches have been and are being de-
veloped (‘back-of-the-envelope simulations’) in order to reduce the resource in-
tensity and data requirements. However, there is trade-off between ease of ap-
plicability and precision of estimated results (Buccirossi et al. 2008: 465). 
2.3.  Difference-in-Differences 
Overviews: Bergman (2008: 394-396); Buccirossi et al. (2008: 466-467); Wein-
berg (2008); Davies & Ormosi (2010: 20-24). 
 
Applications (examples): Ashenfelter & Hosken (2011); Ashenfelter et al. 
(2011); Dobson & Piga (2011); Tenn & Yunn (2011). 
 
                                                            
6  This is different, of course, if a competition policy regime can mandate companies to cooperate in ex 
post analyses.  
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Difference-in-Differences (DiD) methods encompass roughly all methods that 
evaluate a merger control decision by comparing the post-decision performance 
of fundamental market data (like prices or market shares) with (i) the pre-
decision market development and (ii) a control market, which is sufficiently 
similar to the relevant market but unaffected by the event (the merger control 
decision). Many studies belonging to this method are direct econometric analy-
sis of price and market share evolution with the control market serving to iso-
late the impact of the merger control decision from other influences on prices 




The charm of DiD methods is that they analyze actually observed data from the 
relevant product market. Thus, it represents an analysis of what actually hap-
pened on the post-decision market. Moreover, the counterfactual is also real and 
does not depend on non-testable and restrictive (or even heroic) theoretical as-
sumptions (Davies & Ormosi 2010: 22). However, the sensitive problem is to 
find a suitable control group (markets, companies, etc.) that is (i) close enough 
to the relevant market in order to display the same ‘external’ influences but (ii) 
sufficiently far away not to be influenced by the event (the merger control deci-
sion). Furthermore, the same ‘external’ influences must also exert the same im-
pact on prices (etc.) in the relevant market and in the control market (Simpson 
& Schmidt 2008; Davies & Ormosi 2010: 21-22). While this is often challeng-
ing, modern econometric techniques provide suitable instruments to alleviate 
these problems – albeit, not erasing them. 
 
Another issue with DiD methods is that they are inherently atheoretical (Davies 
& Ormosi 2010: 22-23). While this is a disadvantage in terms of understanding 
and learning from the evaluation results, it represents an advantage to the extent 
that complex competition dimensions that are rarely incorporated into modeling 
and simulation are implicitly accounted for by ‘just’ measuring the actual ef-
fects. However, this is only true to the extent that these competition dimensions  
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(dynamic and evolutionary efficiencies of the competitive process) are reflected 
in measurable variables, like prices, elasticities, measures for the number and 




The applicability is firstly constrained by the requirement of the existence of a 
sufficiently appropriate control group (Davies & Ormosi 2010: 23). Secondly, it 
is much more difficult to ex post evaluate merger prohibitions with this method 
compared to cleared mergers wherefore a selection bias to analyzing clearances 
is likely to occur. Counterfactuals can be more easily constructed with cleared 
mergers because the market development prior and after the merger provides 
guidance for evaluation (prior to the merger the counterfactual actually existed, 
albeit at a different point in time). In contrast, in case of prohibited mergers, the 
market development does not provide much guidance. How the market would 
have been with the merger cannot be inferred from any real situation, neither 
from the pre-decision period, nor from a control market (Neven & Zenger 2008: 
478). 
 
On the other hand, from a data availability perspective, the range of applicabil-
ity is rather comprehensive since the required data should be comparatively eas-
ily collectable for most markets. In summary, the most severe restriction ap-
pears to be the bias towards merger clearance decisions and, thus, towards de-




Like structural modeling and simulations, DiD methods must be done on a 
case-by-case level and require sophisticated econometric knowledge. However, 
DiD analyses enjoy the advantage that they require comparatively fewer re-
sources than simulations because of their atheoretical character (no sophisticat- 
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ed modeling is required) and the laxer data requirements. Furthermore, coopera-
tion with companies in the market is usually not needed. 
2.4.  Event Studies 
Overviews: Bergman (2008: 392-394); Buccirossi et al. (2008: 467-469); Da-
vies & Ormosi (2010: 15-20). 
 
Applications (examples): Ellert (1976); Eckbo (1983, 1992); Stillman (1983); 
Eckbo & Wier (1985); Aktas,  Bodt & Roll (2007); Duso,  Neven & Röller 
(2007);  Diepold et al. (2008); Serdarević & Teplý (2009); Duso,  Gugler & 
Szücs (2010); Duso, Gugler & Yurtoglu (2011). 
 
The basic concept behind event studies is that welfare effects of horizontal 
mergers can be evaluated by looking at the stock price reactions (abnormal re-
turns) of the willing-to-merger companies (Ellert 1976) and, in particular, of the 
rivals of the merging firms (Eckbo 1983). In a nutshell, an increase in rivals’ 
share prices implies an anticompetitive merger (price-increasing), a decrease 




The event study method crucially relies on the efficient financial markets hy-
pothesis (EFMH): if financial markets work perfectly and all actors on these 
markets act perfectly rational (actually: hyper-rational) under perfect infor-
mation (or at least under full knowledge of all relevant information), then share 
prices instantly reflect the ‘true’ values to investors. Thus, changes in stock 
prices that occur as a reaction to merger decision-related events (merger an-
nouncement, announcement of investigation by competition authority, merger 
control decision) reveal the respective market assessment, which under the con-
dition of the EFMH can be thought of reflecting unbiased and superior (‘in-
side’) information. However, the plausibility of the EFMH is questionable at  
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best. Neither do agents on financial markets act hyper-rational, nor do the mar-
kets in total reflect superior knowledge about competitive effects that, further-
more, at the time of the stock market reaction lie in the future. The implausibil-
ity and fundamental flaws of the EFMH, actually well-accepted in modern fi-
nancial economics, alone render this method inappropriate to base policy deci-
sion on it. 
 
However, the reliability is further put into doubt (if still possible) by a couple of 
additional problems, for instance, ambiguities in interpreting the observed stock 
price changes (Davies & Ormosi 2010: 18) and the unclear causal relationship 
of stock market movements with merger announcements and control decisions 
(Neven & Zenger 2008: 487). The fields of business activity that are affected by 
the merger decision must have a sufficiently high importance within the merg-
ing companies, which are oftentimes multi-product and multi-subsidiary-
companies (i.e. groups of companies or concerns), whereas non-prohibition 
merger control decisions (conditional approvals, which is the vast majority of 
decisions) usually merely affects few of the market involved. Furthermore, 
many studies assume a price-umbrella effect. Rivals’ profits benefit from an an-
ticompetitive merger because of the ‘rule of one price’: the price for all compa-
nies in the market increases. In contrast, rivals’ profits suffer from a procompet-
itive merger because the merged entity is more efficient now. However, this re-
fers to a specific oligopoly model (quantity competition with homogeneous 
goods) that (i) hardly reflects the nature of competition in many merger markets 
(heterogeneous product markets) and (ii) may not be the way that financial 
markets’ agents think about competitive effects from mergers. Consequently, a 
sound theoretical foundation, rooted in modern competition economics, is miss-
ing. Even furthermore, inextricable feedback loops occur in particular if the 
EFMH would hold. If financial markets are efficient, then they will anticipate 
(i) merger control decisions and (ii) their own influence on ex post evaluation 
and decisions – and reflect this in the stock prices! 
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Eventually, stock price reactions to merger announcements do not actually rep-
resent an ex post evaluation as they happen before or at the time of the merger 
decision. With the exception of the stock market reactions to the final merger 




In summary, the event study method fails to meet the knock-out criterion of 
providing a sufficient minimum reliability. There is no indication that financial 
market reactions represent an accurate prediction of the competitive effects,
8 




The applicability is promoted by easy-to-access data (stock market prices). An 
obvious – but also practically relevant – limitation is that merging companies 
and their rivals need to be stock market companies with a sufficient trade vol-
ume and frequency (Davies & Ormosi 2010: 20). Furthermore, non-horizontal 
mergers are difficult to assess because of the many and ambiguous ways that 




Event studies can be done on large samples of mergers and without looking into 
many case details they can still provide results about type I and type II errors on 
                                                            
7  Competition authorities have additional information (internal documents, etc.) and are better informed 
than the stock market. Thus, they may decide deliberately and for a reason not to follow stock market 
reactions (Neven & Zenger 2008: 487). 
8 Even  Duso, Gugler & Yurtoglu (2010) – with a research design driven by the purpose to demonstrate 
the usefulness of the event study – do not find convincing evidence (inter alia, sensitive reliance on 
long pre-announcement event windows that are arbitrarily delineated as well as sensitive reliance on 
the price umbrella effect even with differentiated product markets). See for more critical discussion 
McAfee & Williams (1988), Eckbo (1989), Werden & Williams (1989), Davies & Ormosi (2010: 19) 
and Fridolfsson & Stennek (2010).  
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a case level. The event study method does require econometric expertise. How-
ever, the easy access to data and the lack of theoretical modeling imply that 
comparatively few resources are needed to conduct these studies. Furthermore, 
cooperation with companies in the market is not needed. 
2.5.  Surveys 
Overviews: Buccirossi et al. (2008: 469-470); Davies & Ormosi (2010: 24-25). 
 
Applications: PricewaterhouseCoopers (2005); Deloitte (2009). 
 
Survey-based ex post impact evaluations are merger decision reviews based on 
follow-up questionnaires and/or interviews. Two types can be distinguished. 
Firstly, the opinions and perceptions of involved companies (merging parties, 
competitors, suppliers, customers, etc.) and other interested parties are collect-





The economics rationale behind conducting survey-based impact evaluations is 
rooted in information asymmetries. If market participants in the first type or ex-
perts and peers in the second type have superior explicit and/or tacit (ex post) 
knowledge about the impact of a merger decision on the underlying competitive 
process, then questionnaires and interviews serve to collect and reveal this 
knowledge to the evaluators. The nature of the asymmetric information implies 
an atheoretical character of this method, which at the same time means that all 
types of competitive effects, whether quantitatively measurable or not, can po-
tentially be captured. 
 
On the downside, surveys depend on the assumption that insiders and/or experts 
(i) actually have superior information and (ii) are willing to offer these infor- 
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mation without strategic distortions. The danger of a respondent bias is particu-
larly high in the case of market participants because they will rationally antici-
pate that their information influences future merger control decisions. At first 
sight, expert commentaries should be less prone to respondent bias, however, 
this is only true when the expert has no party interest and is not looking for fu-
ture assignments either from norm addressees or the competition authority. 
 
Another issue refers to the number of potential survey participants. Since indi-
vidual opinions are rather likely to suffer from strategic or cognitive perception 
biases, a sufficiently large number of potential respondents is required. Regard-
ing expert commentaries, this implies that case reviews by single experts are 




This method is applicable to all types of merger cases and demands virtually no 
data requirements. Thus, this method can also be applied when virtually no 
‘hard’ data is available (Buccirossi et al. 2008: 469). The applicability may be 
limited because of low respondent rates, however. Although this method has so 
far predominantly been done to assess the total performance of a competition 
authority (benchmarking, best practices) and not to evaluate merger decision on 
a case level (Davies & Ormosi 2010: 25), both types (insider-based and experts-
based surveys) can also be applied to evaluate single cases. Once the relevant 
questionnaires are available, it is comparatively easy to repeat the survey, so 
that this method is also realistically dynamically applicable in order to capture 




Developing questionnaires, conducting interviews, motivating respondents and 
professionally analyzing the responses require manpower and statistical expert 
knowledge. However, the resource intensity is comparatively low.  
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3.  Conclusions and Recommendations 
With a view to the potential benefits and pitfalls of ex post evaluations of the 
impact of merger control decisions, two main problem areas must be consid-
ered: 
 
‐  the danger of the employment of insufficiently reliable methods, and 
‐  excessive expectations from and/or interpretations of evaluations. 
 
The first issue, employment of insufficiently reliable methods, highlights the 
higher importance of minimum reliability standards for employed methods 
compared to applicability and resource intensity arguments. Obviously, all 
methods can be designed and executed in inaccurate and insufficient ways. 
Therefore, this is not the issue at hand. Instead, the question is whether any 
method in question produces minimum reliable results given a serious and accu-
rate employment. Since all described methods display strengths and weakness, 
the literature consequently favors employing a method-mix (Buccirossi et al. 
2008; Davies & Ormosi 2010: 25-26). While Davies and Ormosi (2010) em-
phasize the benefits of employing alternative methods to the same cases in or-
der to learn from differences in the assessment, Buccirossi et al. (2008) put a 
stronger focus on relating the methods to case types that suit their individual 
strengths and weaknesses. Furthermore, they emphasize the role of surveys. 
“Whenever feasible, a survey should always be carried out to add insights and 
help the interpretation of the results obtained through other techniques, as well 
as to investigate some aspects of the development of a market that are difficult 
to understand from hard data” (Buccirossi et al. 2008: 469). While principally 
agreeing to advocate methods-mixes, my analysis deviates from the results of 
the previous literature by rejecting the event study method due to a lack of reli-
ability (see section 2.4). As argued in section 2.1, if a technique is not suffi-
ciently minimum reliable, it cannot contribute to better evaluation within any 
method-mix. Instead, it might generate harmful effects (increase in type I and  
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type II errors), in particular if combined with a feasibility bias – which is the 
case with respect to the comparatively easy-to-apply event method. 
 
The second issue deals with expectations about impact evaluation results and 
their interpretation. Since neither perfect methods nor a perfect method-mix are 
available, a cautious approach towards ex post evaluation of merger decisions 
seems appropriate.
9 It should focus on generating knowledge and learning about 
actual effects of merger decisions (regime learning). However, the focus should 
be not so much on counting mistakes or successes of competition authorities 
(agency accountability). Instead, it should focus on how both the merger con-
trol framework and the decision practices can be improved for future decisions. 
The reason for this shift in focus is threefold. Firstly, attempting to record the 
past mistake-success-balance of competition authorities requires to strictly 
acknowledge the original constraints for the decision (timeframes, available re-
sources, available information, institutional flaws, standard of proofs, etc.). If 
an ‘erroneous’ decision was due to such constraints, the competition authority 
cannot really be blamed. However, secondly, such an approach overburdens the 
available methods and, moreover, limits the learning potential from ex post 
evaluations. Thirdly, if ex post evaluation is driven by the desire of external ac-
countability of the competition authority, then a rational behavioral response of 
the authority would be to maximize evaluation success instead of consumer or 
social welfare (see 2.1). 
 
It is more beneficial to conduct ex post merger decision impact evaluations with 
a focus on broad learning about all the effects of these decisions (irrespective of 
contemporary decision constraints for the authority) in order to generate 
knowledge about improving the merger control framework and the actual deci-
sion practice. As this implies ‘learning from many cases for general policy’ in-
stead of attempting to ‘conclude from single cases to other single cases’. Such 
an approach is also a better fit to the capacities of the available evaluation 
                                                            
9  Much in the same spirit, Davies and Ormosi (2010: 26) emphasize the problems, shortcomings and 
limitations of all available evaluation methods rather than the merits and demand further research.  
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methods. For instance, if a result of many case studies is that anticompetitive 
mergers are allowed because the standard of proof and the allocation of the bur-
den to proof are too ambitious for the competition authority to succeed in 
blocking such mergers, then consequences for the rules about proof standards 
and burdens should be drawn. It would be dissatisfying ‘only’ to conclude that 
the competition authority committed no mistakes because it had no choice but 
to allow the anticompetitive merger due to institutional flaws outside its compe-
tence. 
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